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The study by Roth et al. (1) provides a valuable lesson for risk communicators-test
your messages. The factors that determine how a person interprets a risk communication
are subtle and not well understood. As a result, those who draft and disseminate risk
messages cannot accurately predict how they will be interpreted and what influence they will
have.
The results obtained by Roth et al. are surprising in many ways. Particularly
surprising is the finding that the comparisons of unrelated risks were rated relatively
favorably. Although such comparisons have been strongly recommended for more than 25
years as ways to put risks in perspective (2,3,4), they have been criticized for ignoring many
of the quantitative and qualitative factors that determine the perception and acceptance of
risk (5). A harsh editorial in Nature, following Lord Rothschild's advocacy of such
comparisons (6), described them as "the kindergarten of risk." The data obtained by Roth
et al. suggest that these criticisms may have been misplaced and that comparisons among
unrelated risks, if framed carefully, may indeed provide valuable insights.
Before breathing new life into comparisons of unrelated risks, we would like to offer
several reasons for restraint and further study. The first pertains to the fact that the study
by Roth et al. employed only one scenario. In this scenario, respondents were asked to
evaluate the comparison statements from the perspective of advising a plant manager who
is about to communicate to a concerned community in a non-crisis, non-confrontational
atmosphere. Many plant managers must communicate in just such a setting. However, we
believe that it is important to replicate this study within diverse contexts, including a setting
where the community is angry or distrustful as well as a benign setting in which trust, mutual
respect, and meaningful public involvement prevail. We would expect comparisons of
unrelated risks to be relatively less satisfactory as the context becomes increasingly hostile.
Second, other comparison statements should be evaluated in addition to those drafted by
Covello et al. (7). Third, we would like to emphasize a point made by Roth et al. and
provide some supporting evidence. Roth et al. suggest that the specific comparison of
unrelated risks drafted by Covello et al. may have done well because it did not argue that
the risk of cancer was acceptable because it was equal to or smaller than other risks that are
commonly accepted. Instead, this message stated that the "... purpose in making such a
comparison is only to put the risk in context" and "... to gain some perspective on the size
of the risk."
We believe this to be a critical point. Many comparisons of unrelated risks do not
include this qualification. Instead of adopting this modest objective - i.e., providing
perspective~ comparisons of unrelated risks are frequentlyadvanced as a means for setting
priorities and determining which risks are acceptable (7). More specifically, they are
advocated as a means for determining which risks to ignore, which risks to be concerned
about, and how much risk reduction to seek (2, 3, 4, 8, 9).
We believe that these arguments are flawed and that risk acceptability depends on
a wider range of factors than the probabilities or expected fatality or morbidity estimates
that are typically compared. Comparisons that stress acceptability of risk are, therefore,
vulnerable to criticism. To support this claim, we would like to offer some additional
empirical data. We have conducted an experiment in which subjects played the role of
jurors in a simulated trial in which a company that supplied asbestos insulation materials
was charged with exposing the students and staff of a school to unreasonable risk of disease.
In our scenario, the company contended that the use of this product in the school building
did not pose a health hazard to the students and staff of the school.
The subjects in this study were 117 persons who answered an ad in a community
newspaper. They were assigned to one of three groups, each of which received different
information about the risks from asbestos and other hazards. All subjects were given the
same background briefing about the nature of asbestos and its health hazards. They were
also given information about the trial, which was modeled after several actual court cases
in which manufacturers and installers of asbestos materials were sued by parents or school
districts. Finally, all subjects were told that an authoritative source had determined that the
average concentration of asbestos in the air at the school was .001 fibers per cubic
centimeter and that students attending the school for three years faced an increased lifetime
fatality risk of 0.23 per million.
The three information conditions differed as follows:
Group 1 received no additional information. They were asked to answer the
following questions about risk and guilt:
1. In your opinion, how high is the risk of exposure to the asbestos concentrations found
at Jefferson Junior High School?
very low moderate very high
risk risk risk
12 3 4 5 6 7
2. If you were on the jury in this case, would you find [the company] guilty or not guilty of
exposing the students and staff of Jefferson Junior High School to unreasonable risk of
disease resulting from exposure to asbestos fibers introduced into the air by their products?
[ ] guilty [ ] not guilty
Group U received the same background information followed by Exhibit A (shown
in Table 1) comparing the asbestos risk with risks from smoking, diet soft drinks, chest x-
rays, peanutbutter, and background radiation from living in a brick house. Accompanying
Exhibit A was a statement by a (fictitious) expertwitness, Dr. A Davis, called on behalf of
the defendant to explain and interpret the risk comparisons in the table. Dr. Davis
concluded his explanation with the following opinion:
"So now, if w& look at the risk associated with being
exposed to asbestos fibers while attending JeffersonJunior High
School for three years, it's less than one - 0.23 deaths per
million to be precise. That's a very small fraction of the risk
estimated for drinking diet sodas or even for eating peanut
butter sandwiches. So, even though exposure to asbestos at
very high levels has been shown to cause disease, I'd have to
say, based on my professional experience and as a concerned
citizen, that I would have no concern if anyone ~ including
persons from mayown family - were to attend JeffersonJunior
High School."
After examining Exhibit A and reading Dr. Davis' statement, subjects answered the two
questions about risk and guilt.
Insert Table 1 about here
Subjects inGroup I were also shown the comparisons inExhibit A after making their
judgments and they were asked to answer the two questions a second time.
Group HI was given the same information as Group U, including the table of risk
comparisons and the statement by Dr. Davis. In addition, subjects in this group were given
a statement by a (fictitious) expert witness for the plaintiff, Dr. P. Stewart, criticizing the
comparisons shown in Exhibit A Dr. Stewart's testimony, which argues that Exhibit A has
no logical implications regarding the acceptability of the asbestos in the school, is presented
in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 3 presents the mean risk rating and the percentage of guilty judgments for the
three information conditions. Data from Group I shows that the 0.23 lifetime risk estimate,
presented alone, evoked a moderately high rating of risk and a judgment of guilty by more
than half of the subjects. Seventy percent of these same individuals, shown the comparisons
in Table 1, subsequently lowered their judgments of risk; no one gave an increased risk
evaluation. Judgements of guilt were less influenced by the comparisons in Exhibit A
Insert Table 3 about here
Group U, which responded only after seeing the risk comparisons, had a significantly
lower mean risk judgment (p < .01) and a markedly lower percentage of subjects finding
the company guilty (p < .05). Presented without challenge, Exhibit A was clearly effective
in reducing subjects' concerns.
Responses from Group HI, however, were virtually the same as those from Group
I, suggesting that the effects of the comparisons on perceived risk and judged guilt were fully
offset by the critique presented in Table 2.
Technical analyses of the asbestos problem have generally concluded that the risks
to school children are quite small, far lower than the risks to workers who are called upon
to remove the asbestos (10). The data shown in Table 3 suggest that this "small risk" does
not appear small or acceptable to people when presented as a single estimate (0.23 fatalities
per million students). The results show how sensitive perceptions of risk and guilt are to
contextual information provided by a simple table of comparisons and to a critique that
undermines the legitimacy of inferring acceptability of risk from comparisons across diverse
hazards.
The results of this modest empirical study should be interpreted with caution. The
trial setting was artificial and the arguments were quite abbreviated selections from the
many possible ways of presenting, challenging, and counter-challenging the information
about asbestos risks. The few prior attempts to examine the content of risk messages, going
back to Fischhoff (11) and including the study by Roth et al., are similarly incomplete -
more on the order of demonstration studies. Despite being incomplete, these studies do
demonstrate that content and context matter in risk communication. If we take this message
seriously, we should incorporate a carefully designed and executed evaluation component
into every important communication effort.
Recognizing the limitations of our simulated trial, it still seems remarkable to us that
the effects of the comparisons in Exhibit A were so easily offset by the critique despite the
fact that they show the asbestos risk to be minuscule relative to other commonly accepted
risks. This suggests to us that the analyses and opinions of technical experts who believe
that asbestos in schools should be left in place may not be convincing to the public in an
adversarial context. More generally, the impotency of quantitative risk assessment in
adversarial settings has important implications for the way that we manage risk in our
society. One implication is that those who assess and manage risks need to relate to their
constituents over the long term in ways that establish trust, credibility, and mutual respect.
In summary, the simplicity and intuitive appeal of comparisons of unrelated risksmay
be highly deceptive. Many factors appear to play a role in determining whether such
comparisons willbe useful. Whether these kinds of comparisons ultimately generate more
light than heat will depend on the degree to which both the context of risk communication
and the content of the messages are sensitive to these factors.
Table 1
Exhibit A: Lifetime risks per million persons
deaths per million persons
Smoking one pack of cigarettes each 88,000
day for 20 years
Drinking one diet soft drink 170
containing saccharin per day for a lifetime
Chest X-rays 41
Eating 4 tablespoons of peanut butter 11
per day (aflatoxin)
Living in a brick house (radiation) 4
Attending Jefferson Junior High School 0.23
for 3 years (asbestos based on .001
fibers per cubic centimeter)
.
>
Table 2
STATEMENT BY DR. P. STEWART, AN EXPERT WITNESS CALLED ON BEHALF
OF THE PLAINTIFF, JEFFERSON JR. HIGH SCHOOL, IN TESTIMONY ABOUT THE
STATISTICS PRESENTED IN EXHIBIT A
Dr. Stewart: As I understand it, ExhibitA shows the risk per millionpersons of dying from
the activities listed. The numbers shown on the chart are estimates, based on statistical
analyses.
In my opinion, the numbers in this chart are misleading, and fail to have any logical
implications for the asbestos decision under consideration.
First, the estimates in the Exhibit may not be accurate, particularly in the case of
asbestos. The riskvalue given for asbestos is based on an average reading of .001 fibers per
cubic centimeter. But, at times, the level of asbestos fibers people in the building are
exposed to may be much higher (for example, when repair work is being done). The
average exposure given in theexhibit may notaccurately represent the risk from such higher
"peak" concentrations.
My second objection is more fundamental. The fact that one risk is accepted does
not necessarily mean that another, lower risk is acceptable.
Acceptability must weigh risks against benefits. The risks from asbestos, no matter
how small, are not acceptable if there are no compensating benefits or if there are less risky
alternatives that can provide similar benefits.
Furthermore, most of the risks presented in Exhibit A are voluntary activities.
Attending a school contaminated by asbestos is involuntary, not under the control of the
children who are at risk. The standards for acceptability need to be much stricter for
exposing children involuntarily to risk.
So, I'd have to say, as a professional and as a parent of school-age children, that the
risks from exposure to the asbestos levels found at Jefferson JuniorHigh may indeed by low.
They may be very low. But I wouldn't want to expose my kids even to a theoretical risk of
asbestos if I didn't have to.
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Table 3
Perceived Risk and Judgments of Guilt for Three Information Conditions
Mean Perceived % Finding Company
Risk Guilty
Group
Information
Presented N
I. Lifetime risk 30 3.53 (2.13) 54 (45)
n. Lifetime risk plus
Exhibit A
27 2.48 30
m. Lifetime risk,
Exhibit A, and
critique of
Exhibit A 60 3.53 52
Note: Parenthesized values for Group I summarize responses after being shown Exhibit A
Perceived risk decreased for 21 of 30 subjects, remained the same for 9 subjects, and
increased for 0 subjects. Two subjects changed their assignments from guilty to not guilty.
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